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JUVENILE DETENTION HEARINGS: THE CASE
FOR A PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
Nancy Hoffman* and
Kristine Mackin McCarthy**
INTRODUCTION
"For instance, now," [the Queen] . . . went on . . "there's
the King's Messenger. He's in prison now being pun-
ished: and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednes-
day: and of course the crime comes last of all." "Suppose he
never commits the crime?" said Alice. "That would be all
the better, wouldn't it?" ,the Queen said . .. .
The backward world depicted by Lewis Carroll no longer
exists in the adult criminal process, but in the juvenile court sys-
tem, vestiges of illogic remain. In California, a supposedly en-
lightened jurisdiction, a juvenile accused of a crime may find him-
self detained in juvenile hall for as long as twenty-one days or
more2 before there is any determination that he has committed
'the crime with which he is charged. Under the guise of parens
patriae, the juvenile court has taken short cuts that unnecessarily
undermine due process. Recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court have mandated that certain constitutional rights
apply in the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile court proceeding.'
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** B.A., 1971, Loretto Heights College, Denver, Colo.; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
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1. L. CARROLL, THROUGH ThE LOOKING GLASS 225-27 (Modem Library ed.),
quoted in Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1489 n.1
(1966).
2. A juvenile may be kept in custody for forty-eight hours before a petition
to declare him a ward or dependent child is filed. Since nonjudicial days are not
included within this forty-eight hour period it is conceivable that a juvenile could
be detained another three days if he is picked up before a three day weekend.
After the detention hearing he may be detained fifteen judicial days before thejurisdictional hearing is held to determine his guilt or innocence. Of course this
fifteen day period does not include week-ends or other holidays. See CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE §§ 631 (West Supp. 1974), 632, 636 (West 1972).
3. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970); in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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However, it is still unclear what constitutional guarantees apply
to the decision to detain a juvenile prior to his adjudication as a
juvenile offender.4
This article focuses on the detention hearing as a critical
stage in the proceeding against a juvenile. The present state of
the law is analyzed with particular attention devoted to the four
jurisdictions that require, by statute, a probable cause finding at
the detention hearing;5 in addition, the article examines the juvenile
detention process in California.
Recent trends in statutory enactments and case law since In
re Gault' provide the basis for our contention that a probable
cause hearing is necessary prior to the detention of a juvenile ac-
cused of a crime. 7  This article suggests that the preliminary
hearing in the adult criminal process should serve as a model to
be followed in juvenile court proceedings. In addition, the prob-
lems that may arise by requiring a probable cause hearing are re-
viewed and possible solutions are suggested.
WHAT Is DETENTION?
A place of "detention" means different things to different
people. To a poorly informed public it is "[w]here the bad kids
are."'  To most law enforcement officers it is "[w]here you take
minors who have broken the law." 9  To the minor in detention
it frequently is "where they lock you up. '' 0 To many juvenile
4. Some cases have decreed that juveniles are to be accorded constitutional
safeguards in the detention process. See, e.g., Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209
(9th Cir. 1970) (right to a fair trial); Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971) (protection against double jeopardy);
In re Donna G., 6 Cal. App. 3d 890, 86 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970) (dictum) (protec-
tion from statutory vagueness); In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 861 (1966) (detention orders must be supported by evidence).
5. These jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Illinois, New York, and
Alaska.
6. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. Recognizing that minor revisions in the law are more readily accepted
than sweeping changes, we have proposed a probable cause determination at de-
tention hearings only for those juveniles accused of crimes. Aside from this prac-
tical consideration, we have limited our discussion to this particular category of
juveniles partially because of our feeling that the entire process for handling de-
pendent, "out-of-control" and neglected juveniles needs to be revised, not simply
handled with greater procedural due process. Moreover, the case law supporting
a probable cause finding has derived from fact situations involving criminal
charges. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the arguments for providing a prob-
able cause determination at detention hearings of juveniles charged with crimes
may be equally persuasive for proceedings relating to other juveniles who stand
to lose their liberty.
8. Jordan, The Responsibility of the Superintendent to Maintain the Func-
tion of Detention, 19 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 50 (1968).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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court judges it is a convenient repository for juveniles for whom
there is no other facility immediately available to effect a proper
disposition-a storehouse for future dispositions." One com-
mentator has defined detention as the "[tiemporary care, of [a
child] who require[s] secure custody, in [a] physically restrict-
ing [facility] pending court disposition."'1 2  Detention is to be
carefully distinguished from shelter care which is, "[t]emporary
care in a physically unrestricting facility pending the child's return
to his own home or placement for longer term care."'" Shelter
care generally is used for dependent and neglected children who
are placed in boarding homes, group homes, and temporary care
institutions. 14 Children apprehended for delinquency whose homes
are not fit for their return but who, with proper handling,
are not likely to run away may also be placed in shelter care.'"
If detention is used properly, only those children who have com-
mitted delinquent acts and who are in need of secure custody for
their own protection or the protection of society will be "de-
tained."'" Moreover, if the differentiation between detention and
shelter care is faithfully adhered to there will be no dependent,
neglected, or mentally deficient children held in detention homes,
and the alternative methods of caring for these children in foster
homes, group homes, and through homemaker services will be
more fully developed.' 7
Detention or shelter care of a child involves a temporary in-
fringement on the rights of the parent and the child. However,
in both instances, the real burden of adjustment falls upon the
child, who must learn to cope with a new living arrangement and
separation from his family at a time when he is likely to be upset
and apprehensive at the prospect of court action.' 8  Since deten-
11. Id.
12. W. SHERIDAN, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 23 (1966).
Similar definitions are found in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY,
MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS 5 (1966), which states that "'Detention'
means the temporary care of a child who requires secure custody in any facility
pending court disposition or execution of a court order for commitment." In NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT 10
(1959), "detention" is define d as:
the temporary care of children who require secure custody for their own
or the community's protection in physically restricting facilities pending
court disposition.
13. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 119 (1967).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jordan, The Responsibility of the Superintendent to Maintain the Func-
tion of Detention, 19 JUV. CT. JUDGES J. 50 (1968).
17. Id.
18. W. SHERIDAN, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 60 (1966).
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tion is extremely disruptive ,to a child's emotional security, it
should be used only when drastic action is needed.'" Unfortu-
nately, the courts resort to juvenile detention far too frequently
and routinely.20 To remedy this overuse of detention, it has been
suggested that legislation be enacted to restrict both the authority
to detain -and the circumstances under which detention would be
permitted. 2' This restrictive legislation would provide for deten-
tion only when it is clearly necessary to protect the youth or com-
munity or to keep the juvenile within the jurisdiction of the ju-
venile court. 22
Pre-adjudicatory detention of a child generally is authorized
for two reasons: (1) to prevent him from running away before
his appearance in court, 23 or (2) to prevent him from committing
an offense dangerous to himself or the community before disposi-
tion of his case.24  The National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency (NCCD) has suggested criteria for detention thaA are
aimed at strengthening the role of the probation officer in helping
the child and the family in the community pending court disposi-
tion. 25  The NCCD makes it clear that detention should not be
used unless failure to do so would be likely to place the child or
the community in danger; 26 that no child should be detained un-
less he or she is almost certain to run away or commit other of-
fenses; and that detention should not be used as a substitute for
shelter care, as a convenient way to hold a child for an interview,
or as a corrective or punitive measure.2 7
Despite -the "shalt nots" in the NCCD standards, an examina-
tion of juvenile detention practices reveals that in fact juveniles
are detained for reasons other than those recommended by the
NCCD.28  This is true primarily because statutory standards for
19. Detention and Shelter Use and Practice, 23 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 21 (1972).
20. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY & YOUTH CRIME 36
(1967).
21. Id. at 37.
22. Id. The Task Force Report suggests that children, for whom detention
is necessary only because of the unavailability of parental supervision, should be
placed in low security community residential centers. Id.
23. Included in this category are those children being held for transfer to
other counties or states.
24. Ferster & Courtless, Juvenile Detention in an Affluent County, 6 FAM.
LQ. 3, 5 (1972).
25. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, STANDARDS & GUIDES FOR
THE DETENTION OF CHILDREN & YOUTH 15-17 (2d ed. 1961).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 11, where it is stated:
The most common reason . . . for misuse and overuse [of juvenile de-
tention] is that it is allowed to function as a substitute for probation
;nd other vommunity services and facilities,
[Vol. 15270
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determining when ,the conditions for detention have been met are
vague. 2
9
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Statutory Overview
Twenty-four states in the Uni-ted States and the District of
Columbia specifically provide for detention of a juvenile -to avoid
danger ,to the community." The "danger" referred to in this con-
See generally Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection,
Prevention or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 161, 164 (1969). The authors
note that although authorities state that a juvenile should be detained if necessary
to assure his presence in court, they differ on how to determine whether a par-
ticular child might run away. Statutes authorizing detention to assure presence
in court do not use "almost certain" (suggested by the NCCD) that he will run
away as a standard, but use looser terminology instead.
29. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.15(c) (Supp. 1974) (deten-
tion pending hearing is allowed if "offenses are so serious that release would en-
danger public safety"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260 171(1) (1971) (child shall be
released except where immediate welfare of the child or protection of the com-
munity requires the child be detained); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 53.02(b)(1)
(1973) (child may be detained prior to a hearing if he is likely to abscond or
be removed from the jurisdiction).
A problem related to vague standards for detention is that the grounds for
initially taking a juvenile into custody are also ambiguous and overly broad in
many jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2 (Supp. 1973) (any
child who is wayward); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-194(2) (1960) (the child has vio-
lated a law and the officer believes custody is necessary to protect the public in-
terest). See also Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police
Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REV. 567, 583-84 (1969). The
authors point out that most juvenile codes use the phrase "taking into custody"
instead of "arrest." Almost half of the laws in these jurisdictions specifically say
that the process does not constitute an arrest.
California's initial intake practices are discussed in Aubrey, The Nature,
Scope and Significance of Pre-Trial Detention of Juveniles in California, 1 BLACK
L.J. 160, 162 & n.15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Aubrey], citing Sumner, A Sum-
mary of Locking Them Up: A Study of Initial Juvenile Detention Decisions in
Selected California Counties 8-15 (1968) (a project sponsored by NCCD). Au-
brey documents the fact that proportionate rates of detention in California far ex-
ceed recommended figures and are currently increasing despite emphasis on the
protection of the rights of minors. Aubrey at 163 & n.24, citing BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 161 (1968).
30. ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.140(a) (Supp. 1974); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 636 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 975(a)(3) (Supp. 1970); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2308(a) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03(3)(c)(1) (1974);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1401 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-31 (Supp. 1973);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 31-5-7-12 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.110 (1974); MD. CODE ANN., COURTS
& JuD. PROC. § 3-823(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 712A.15
(a) (Supp. 1974); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-1212 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43.205.03 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-56b.(2) (Supp. 1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 13-14-22(1) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 728(b)
(iii), 739(b) (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-14 (1974); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 21.51.31 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 50-309 (Supp.
1974); S.D. COMp. LAWS § 26-8-19.2 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214
(Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-91(1) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33
§ 643 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.7(ii) (Supp. 1973).
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text is the likelihood that the child will commit further offenses a.3
Three states permit detention when it is a matter of immediate
and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or the person
or property of another.3 2  Nine states allow detention when it is
"required to protect the person and property of others."'3 3  Other
statutes set forth this standard in rather vague terms, some looking
to the nature of the offense with which the juvenile is charged, 34
others attempting to define the probability that the child will com-
mit a new offense,35 and the rest simply expressing a general
desire for the protection of the community.30
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have statutory
provisions designed to assure the child's presence in court at the
next hearing. 37 These statutes provide for detention of a juvenile
31. Ferster & Courtless, Juvenile Detention in an Affluent County, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 3, 7 (1972).
32. See note 30 supra for citations to statutes of California, Illinois, and Ne-
braska.
33. See note 30 supra for citations of statutes of Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont and Wyoming.
34. Michigan detains if the offense is "so serious" that release would endanger
public safety. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.15(c) (Supp. 1974). Kentucky
detains if the "nature of the offense" indicates the necessity of keeping the child
in secure custody. KY. REv. STAT. § 208.110.3 (1973). New Jersey detains if
the nature of the conduct charged is such that the safety of the community would
be dangerously threatened if the juvenile were not detained. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4-5b.(2) (Supp. 1974).
35. New Mexico requires a showing of probable cause that if the child is not
detained he will commit injury to the persons or property of another. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-22(1) (Supp. 1974). New York requires a serious risk that the
minor will do an act that would b. a crime if committed by an adult. N.Y. FAM-
ILY COURT AcT § 739(b) (McKinney 1963).
36. See note 30 supra for citations to statutes of Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii
and South Dakota, which requires detention for the "protection" of the commu-
nity; Indiana, which requires release if it can be done without danger to the pub-
lic; and Utah, which permits detention when release is unsafe for the publ'c. In
addition, the codes in three states express a similar idea in allowing detention to
protect the welfare of the community. IDAHO CODE § 16-1811 (Supp. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.573(3)(b) (1973).
Three states have codes which allow detention when it is in the best interest of
the community. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2608 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-197(2) (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5A-2 (Supp. 1974).
Mississippi allows detention to protect other children. Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
13 (1973).
37. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 636 (West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2310(a)(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.03(3)(c) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §
24A-1401 (Supp. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-04 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MD.
CODE ANN., COURTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-823(b)(2) (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 712A.15 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-13 (1973);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-1212 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43.204.03
(Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-22(3) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. FAMILY
COURT ACT §§ 728(b)(iii), 739(a) (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
20-14 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-56b.(1) (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.31(D) (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. tit. 11 § 50-309 (Supp. 1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-214 (Supp. 1974); TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 53.02(b)(1)
(1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.7(iii) (Supp. 1973).
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where, for example, the child "may abscond"3 or where he or
she is "likely to flee the jurisdiction."39 A New York statute re-
quires that there be a "substantial probability" that the child will
not appear in court;40 New Mexico requires that there be "prob-
able cause" to believe the child will run away or be taken from
the jurisdiction of the court;4 ' and Michigan requires proof that
,the child already has run away from home.4z Assuring the child's
presence in court is the rationale most often used ,to justify the
detention of runaways.4 3
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia require a de-
-tention hearing of some sort.44  Only four jurisdictions, however,
specifically call for a probable cause determination at that hear-
ing.43 The provisions in the District of Columbia statute require
a detention hearing within one day (excluding Sundays) after the
child has been taken into custody. At this hearing the judge first
determines whether detention is required under the statute.46  If
the judge finds that detention is required he must hear evidence
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the al-
legations in the delinquency petition are true.47 Where probable
cause exists he may order the child detained, setting forth the rea-
sons for his decision. When there is a finding of no probable
cause, the child must be released.4" This is a strangely reversed
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1401 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-
1212 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-14 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11 § 50-309 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214 (Supp. 1974).
39. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628 (West 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37
§ 703-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
40. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 739(a) (McKinney 1963).
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-22(3) (Supp. 1973).
42. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.15(b) (Supp. 1974).
43. Ferster & Courtless, Juvenile Detention in an Affluent County, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 3, 5 (1972).
44. ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (Supp. 1974)" CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE§ 632 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1971); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2312 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1404 (Supp. 1974); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 571-32(a) (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-06 (Smith-Hurd
1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-5-7-9 (1973); MD. CODE ANN., COURT & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-823(b) (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.14 (1968); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:4-58 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-24(2) (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 728(a) (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
20-17 (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 419.577(3) (1974); PA. STAT. tit. 11 § 50-312(b) (Supp. 1974); S.D.
COMp. LAWS § 26-8-19.2 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-217(b) (Supp.
1974); TEX. FAMILY CODES ANN. § 54.01(a) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-
10-91(1) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 643 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-5A-2 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.10 (Supp. 1973).
45. See note 44 supra for citations to statutes of Alaska, District of Columbia,
Illinois and New York.
46. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(a)(1) (1973). The statutory criteria are
found in section 16-2310.
47. Id. § 16-2312(e).
48. Id. § 16-2312(f).
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procedure. If the probable cause determination as to whether the
allegations of the petition are itrue were made initially and no
probable cause found, no further determination would be neces-
sary. A determination that probable cause is lacking would be
essentially a determination that -the court has no basis for assuming
jurisdiction over the child. Under the District of Columbia Code,
as it is now written, however, a judge determines whether deten-
tion is necessary even before deciding whether the court has prob-
able jurisdiction to effect such ,a determination.
In Illinois, a minor taken into temporary custody must be
brought before a judicial officer for a detention hearing within
thirty-six hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays. 49 At the
hearing, if the judge finds there is no probable cause to believe
the minor is a delinquent child,50 'he must be released. If the
court concludes that there is probable cause to believe that the
minor falls within the statutory description of "delinquent," and
further that the statutory criteria for detention are met, then the
court may order detention or shelter care in an appropriate place.5'
There are no provisions protecting the minor's right to examine
or confront witnesses. Only -the court has the right to examine
witnesses in relation to any allegations connected with the peti-
tion.52
The New York Family Court Act provides for a finding
similar 'to a probable cause determination if the child who has
been taken into custody is brought before the court prior to the
filing of a petition. 3  In such an instance the judge must make
a preliminary finding as to whether the court appears to have juris-
diction over the child. The child has the right to remain silent
and the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing. If it
appears the court does not have jurisdiction over the child, or if
he appears -to be a child in need of supervision5 4 rather than a
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-5(1) (Smith-Hurd 1972).
50. Id. § 702-1 provides in pertinent part:
Proceedings may be instituted under the provision of this Act concern-
ing boys and girls who are delinquent, otherwise in need of supervision,
neglected or dependent ....
51. Id. § 703-6(2) (Supp. 1974). Detention is authorized if it is a matter
of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor or the persons
or property of another, or if the minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction. Id.
52. Id. § 703-6.
53. N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT § 728 (McKinney 1963).
54. N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). A "per-
son in need of supervision" is defined as
a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen
years of age who does not attend school . . . or who is incorrigible, un-
governable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of
parent or other lawful authority.
[Vol. 15
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juvenile delinquent,55 then the court must order his release. If
the child appears to be a delinquent, he must still be released un-
less there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in
court on the return date, or there is a serious risk that before the
return date he may commit a criminal act."
After the filing of a petition, the court, in its discretion, may
either release the child or direct his detention. There is no re-
quirement for a probable cause determination as to whether the
allegations in the petition are true.57
Under the Alaska statute a policeman may take into custody
a minor who violates a law or ordinance in his presence, who has
been lawfully arrested by a citizen or whom he believes to be a
fugitive from justice.5" Such detention may be continued in a
juvenile detention facility if the officer believes it necessary to
protect ,the minor or the community.5" Within forty-eight hours
of the initial detention the court must hold a hearing to determine
that probable cause exists to believe the minor is delinquent.
At this hearing the minor is entitled to be informed of the grounds
upon which the probable cause determination and the decision to
detain will be made. He is entitled to counsel and has the right
to confront the witnesses used against him.6" If the court finds
that probable cause exists to believe the minor is delinquent, it
may either release him to the custody of a suitable person or order
him detained. If it finds no probable cause the minor must be
released and the case dismissed.61 The Alaska statute provides
-the judge with no criteria to guide him in making his decision
whether or not to detain the minor after probable cause has been
established. In John Doe v. State,62 however, the Alaska Su-
preme Court interpreted the statute and set forth general guide-
lines to be followed by the courts. In that case the court held
-that a child is entitled -to remain free pending a determination by
a juvenile court that he is delinquent, dependent, or in need of
supervision, so long as the court has reasonable assurances that
55. A "juvenile delinquent" is defined as a "person over seven and less than
sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute
a crime." Id. § 712(a).
56. N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT § 728(b) (iii) (McKinney 1963).
57. Id. § 739. But see People v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 298 N.E.2d 109
(1973), which held that if a full fact-finding hearing is not held within three days
as mandated by the Family Court Act, there must be a showing of facts to indi-
cate probable cause to hold the juvenile. In dictum, the court stated that it may
be desirable to view the earlier detention hearing as an appropriate time to con-
duct an inquiry into probable cause. Id. at 310, 298 N.E.2d at 112.
58. ALAs. STAT. § 47.10.140(a) (1971).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 47.10.140(c).
61. Id. § 47.10.140(d).
62. Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
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the child will appear at future proceedings. The court noted that
this freedom from detention would be required even though the
facts upon which a petition is based involve an act which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would be a crime. The court further held
that when a child cannot return home, every effort must be made
to place him in an environment where his freedom will not be
curtailed, and he should be detained only if there is clearly no
alternative available.6 3
Of the four statutory schemes requiring a probable cause de-
termination, only that of Alaska, as interpreted by its courts, 64
fully protects the juvenile against unreasonable detention. The
District of Columbia's inappropriately reversed procedure, the
failure of the Illinois statute to grant the juvenile the right to cross-
examine and confront witnesses, and the vague New York re-
quirement that the court "appear" to have jurisdiction, all fall far
short of providing adequate assurance that a juvenile will be de-
tained only upon a finding of probable cause that he has com-
mitted the crime with which he is charged.
Juvenile Detention in California
The purpose of the Juvenile Court Law in California is de-
clared in part to be
to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court such care and guidance preferably in his own home, as
will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical wel-
fare of the minor and the best interests of the State; to pre-
serve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever pos-
sible, removing him from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot
be adequately safeguarded without removal .... 65
The decision to remove a child from the custody of his parents
is governed by this general standard.
The specific provisions dealing with pre-adjudicatory detention
of a minor in California provide that any person under eighteen
years of age may be taken into custody if a police officer believes
the juvenile comes under the jurisdiction of the court, 66 is a ward
of the court, has violated a court order, or has escaped from com-
63. Id. at 52-53.
64. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971).
65. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West 1972).
66. Id. §§ 600, 601 (West 1972) and 602 (West Supp. 1974) describe the
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section 600 describes de-
pendent children, section 601 describes those minors who are habitually disobedi-
ent, truant, or in danger of leading an idle, immoral life, and section 602 describes
those who have violated a law or court order.
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mitment.17  A juvenile also may be taken into 'temporary custody
and detained if he is found in a public place and is suffering from
sickness or injury which requires medical care or hospitalization. 68
Additionally, a minor may be taken into custody when an officer
has reasonable cause to believe the minor has committed a public
offense in his presence, when the officer has reasonable cause to
believe the minor has committed a felony, or when the minor is
involved in a traffic accident and the officer has reasonable cause
to believe he was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or drugs.69
The initial decision whether or not to detain the minor is
made by the peace officer who takes him into custody. The of-
ficer is authorized to release the minor outright, release him upon
the written promise of the minor, his parent, guardian or responsi-
ble relative that either or both will appear at a designated time
and place, or deliver custody of the minor to a probation officer
of the county. The statutory guidelines directing the officer's
choice require him to choose the alternative which is least restric-
tive of the minor's freedom, and still serves the best interests of
the minor and the community. 70
If the juvenile is brought before a probation officer, a second
decision whether or not .to detain him is made at this time. The
probation officer must release the minor to the custody of his
parents, guardian, or responsible relative after an investigation 71
unless: (1) the minor is in need of effective parental care and
he has no parent, guardian, or relative willing or able to provide
such care; (2) he is destitute or is not provided with the necessi-
ties of life or a home or suitable place of abode; (3) his home
is unfit by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity of the person
having custody of the minor; (4) continued detention is a matter
of immediate or urgent necessity for the protection of the minor
or of the person or property of another; (5) the minor is likely
to flee the jurisdiction; (6) he has violated an order of the court;
or (7) he is physically dangerous to the public because of a men-
67. Id. § 625 (West 1972).
68. Id. This section further provides that any minor taken into custody upon
reasonable cause to believe (1) he is a person described in section 601 or 602,
or (2) upon reasonable cause to believe that he has violated an order of the juve-
nile court or (3) escaped a commitment of the juvenile court must be advised of
his constitutional rights, including his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present during interrogation.
69. Id. § 625.1.
70. Id. § 626.
71. Id. § 629. This section allows the probation officer to require, as a con-
dition of release, a written promise to appear at a designated place and time signed
by the minor, his parent, guardian or responsible relative, or both.
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tal or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality. 72  If under
,these standards the probation officer determines that the child
must be detained, a petition must be filed immediately 3 and a
detention hearing held on the next judicial day.7 4  The minor
must be served with a copy of the petition and he and his parents
or guardians must be notified of the time and place of the deten-
tion hearing. 75 The hearing may be continued if there has not been
proper notice. 76  Unless a petition has been filed or a criminal
complaint issued against a minor in custody, he must be released
within forty-eight hours from the time he is initially detained by
the peace officer. 7
7
At -the detention hearing, which is held before a judge or
referee, the minor and his parents or guardian must first be in-
formed of the reasons why the minor was -taken into custody, the
nature of the juvenile court proceedings, and 'the right of both the
minor and his parents to be represented by counsel in all stages
of the proceedings.78 After examining the minor and his parents,
and hearing 'all relevant evidence they wish to present, the court
must make an order releasing the minor from custody unless he
has violated an order of the juvenile court; he has escaped from
a commitment of -the juvenile court; it is a matter of urgent neces-
'sity for the protection of the person or property of another that
the minor be detained; or the minor is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion.79 If it appears that one of these four conditions exists, the
juvenile may, in the discretion of the judge or referee, be ordered
detained until the jurisdictional hearing which must be held within
fifteen judicial days.8"
The major shortcoming of California's detention statute is its
failure to provide precise guidelines for determining when a court
can order a juvenile detained. Criteria in the statute such as
"urgent and immediate necessity" and "likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion" are vague and allow broad discretion on the part of the court.
The loss of one's liberty, even temporarily, is too consequential to
be decided by such imprecise standards. One commentator has
noted that locking up children charged with or suspected of of-
fenses, prior to adjudication, puts a child through a negative ex-
72. Id. § 628.
73. Id. § 630(a) (West Supp. 1974).
74. Id. § 632 (West 1972).
75. Id. § 630(a) (West Supp. 1974).
76. Id. §§ 637, 638 (West 1972).
77. Id. § 631(a) (West Supp. 1974).
78. Id. § 633 (West 1972).
79. Id. § 635.
80. Id. § 636.
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perience likely to contribute to future delinquent or criminal con-
duct. s '
Furthermore, for the juvenile, the problem is compounded
since pre-adjudication detention has the potential of altering the
final disposition of his case. A juvenile who has been released
is more readily available to discuss the case with his attorney 2
and, more importantly, may be able to make a showing of satis-
factory home adjustment at the adjudicatory hearing, thus directly
affecting the disposition of his case. It is also noteworthy that
when the juvenile is detained, he must pay the cost of his stay
in juvenile hall and run the risk of being labeled "delinquent" by
his peers. ss
The authors of this article propose that not only should a
detention hearing be required whenever a juvenile is accused of
committing a crime, but there should be a probable cause deter-
mination of whether or not the juvenile has committed 'the alleged
offense before he can be detained pending further proceedings.
A number of decisions in various jurisdictions explicitly support
this proposition. 4 Several cases in California can be interpreted
as calling for a probable cause determination at the detention
hearing,85 but juvenile courts throughout the state have been slow
to require such a determination. To understand the rationales
operating to enforce the status quo in the juvenile court process,
it is helpful to consider the case law development since the United
States Supreme Court decided In re Gaults6 in 1967.
DEVELOPING CASE LAW: GAULT AND BEYOND
The classification of the juvenile court under the aegis of the
present parens patriae doctrine and the impact this classification
has had on the theoretical and historical development of the ju-
venile court process have made application of -traditional legal
concepts difficult. As a result, society deals with child offenders
81. Aubrey, supra note 29, at 164.
82. See Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970) holding that under
the circumstances of the case the failure to release the juvenile for the purpose
of aiding in the preparation of his defense unconstitutionally interfered with his
due process right to a fair trial.
83. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE 58 (C.E.B. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE].
84. See, e.g., In re Black Bonnet v. State, 357 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973);
Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
People v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 298 N.E.2d 109 (1973).
85. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970);
In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966). See text accom-
panying notes 105-117 infra.
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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in a manner much different from that in which it deals with adult
offenders. The adult offender is considered an enemy of society.
Generally, he is forced to undergo a criminal proceeding, adver-
sary in nature, at which he will be accused, given a chance to
defend himself, and be judged guilty or not guilty. If found
guilty, punishment will be meted out by society according to the
seriousness of -the crime. The juvenile offender, on the other
hand, is treated not as society's enemy but as its child. The state
is interested in helping him, rather than in punishing him. It pur-
ports to do what is believed to be in the child's best interest. The
issues in adult court are criminal responsibility and punishment.
8 7
The issue in the juvenile court is how best to treat a juvenile of-
fender through understanding, guidance, and protection.
The development of the juvenile court was the culmination
of increased concern for the need to protect children from the
harshness and emotional degradation of adult criminal courts
and penal institutions.8 8  Thus, the theory of the juvenile court
was that
[t]he child who must be brought into court should, of course,
be made to know that he is face to face with the powers of the
state, but he should at the same time and more emphatically,
be made to feel he is the object of its care and solicitude
89
In place of the austere sentencing judge of the criminal court, the
juvenile court judge was to be
[s]eated at a desk with the child at his side, where he can on
occasion put his arm around his shoulders and draw the lad
to him . . . and thereby gain immensely in the effectiveness
of his work.90
Carried to what may be considered an extreme, the concept
of parens patriae had to a large extent removed the juvenile court
from the mainstream of the American judicial system and ren-
dered it something akin to a social agency. The emphasis on the
social aspect of -the juvenile court's function had in many respects
been at the expense of accepted legal procedures and rights. Re-
cent Supreme Court cases dealing with the juvenile court system
can be seen as an attempt to rectify this over-emphasis. 91
87. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 10.
88. The Philosophy and Theory of the Juvenile Court, 23 Juv. CT. JuDGES
J. 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Court].
89. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
90. Id.
91. Juvenile Court, supra note 88, at 5.
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The Supreme Court Looks at Juvenile Justice
The Supreme Court took its first close look at the juvenile
court in Kent v. United States. 2 This case dealt specifically with
the requirements for a valid waiver of the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion and transfer for trial to the adult court. 3 The Supreme
Court stated that, in addition to raising problems concerning the
construction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, the
case also poses a question of the justifiability of according a juve-
nile less protection than adults suspected of criminal offenses.9 4
The Court noted that in this instance there was an absence of
any'indication that the denial of rights available to adults was off-
set or mitigated by a parens patriae approach or the special solici-
tude for juveniles commanded by the Juvenile Court Act."
Justice Fortas, for the majority, further emphasized that studies
and critiques of juvenile courts in recent years have raised various
questions as to whether their actual success with juveniles meas-
ures well enough against their theoretical purpose to justify im-
munizing the juvenile court from the reach of constitutional guar-
antees applicable to adults.9 6 Though the Court expressed con-
cern about the lack of constitutional guarantees for juveniles, the
case ultimately was decided on statutory grounds, thus avoiding
a decision on the vital constitutional issues. The Court held that
when there is to be a waiver of jurisdiction under the District of
Columbia statute, there must be accorded to the defendant a hear-
ing, effective assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons for
the waiver.9 7 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the hearing
must measure up to the basic requirements of due process. 8
One year later, in In re Gault,99 the United States Supreme
Court faced head-on the constitutional issues it had avoided in
Kent. Although the Court limited its role in Gault to ascertaining
the precise impact of the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments upon the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile
92. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See generally Comment, luvenile Rights Under the
Fourth Amendment, 11 J. FAM. L. 753 (1972).
93. 383 U.S. at 546. The code then in force in the District of Columbia pro-
vided:
If a child 16 years of age or older is charged with an offense which
would amount to a felofiy in the case of an adult, or any child charged
with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death
or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive juris-
diction ....
D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961), superceded by D.C. CODE § 16-2301 et seq. (1973).
94. 383 U.S. at 551.
95. Id. at 555-56.
96. Id. at 555.
97. Id. at 561.
98. Id. at 562.
99. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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court proceeding, the decision was of great consequence. It
guaranteed to juveniles the right to counsel, notice of charges, the
right against self-incrimination and the right to confront and ex-
amine witnesses. However, Gault did not hold that all procedural
guarantees afforded adults charged with a crime apply to juven-
iles. The Gault decision therefore left undecided a number of
constitutional issues relating to hearsay testimony, burden of
proof, right to a transcript, right to trial by jury, right to bail, right
to a public proceeding and the right against unreasonable search
and seizure. 10
Following Gault, the range of constitutional guarantees af-
forded a juvenile was further expanded in In re Winship.' Win-
ship presented a narrow question-whether proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in the adjudicatory stage is required by due process
when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult.'02 The Court held that in addi-
tion to the constitutional safeguards prescribed by Gault, due
process requires that there be a showing of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt during the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency pro-
ceeding. 10 3
Finally, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,' the Court con-
sidered whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment assures the right to trial by jury in the adjudicatory phase
of a state juvenile delinquency proceeding. In a plurality deci-
sion, the Court concluded that trial by jury in the adjudicatory
stage is not a constitutional requirement. 05
Has McKeiver v. Pennsylvania marked the end of a trend
100. See Dorsen & Resneck, In Re Gault and the Future of luvenile Law, 1
FAM. L.Q. 1, 3-5 (1967).
101. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
102. Id. at 359. Prior to this decision there were two views on how Gault
would affect the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings. One view held that
the spirit of Gault transcended the specific issues raised and the rights granted
by that decision would be meaningless without the "beyorid a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof. The other view distinguished Gault on the ground that the
Gault Court had specifically refused to rule on the issue of standard of proof-
Thus, constitutional rights could be granted to juveniles only by specific holding
rather than as part of a trend. Note, Standard of Proof Required in a Delin-
quency Adjudication, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1970).
103. 397 U.S. at 368.
104. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
105. Id. at 545. Justice Blackman announced the Court's judgment in an
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White joined. Jus-
tices Brennan and White filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Brennan con-
cluded that jury trials are not required in juvenile proceedings so long as some
other aspect of the process (such as a public trial) protects the interests jury trials
are intended to serve. Id. at 553-56. Justice Harlan took the position that crimi-
nal jury trials are not constitutionally required. Id. at 557. Justices Douglas,
Black and Marshall dissented.
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to grant juveniles all the rights guaranteed to adults in criminal
proceedings? Although the decision may not signify that the
trend begun by Gault has ended, it certainly illustrates one
of two polarized viewpoints as to what constitutional protections
are appropriate in the juvenile court. The McKeiver view is to
apply Kent, Gault, and Winship strictly within the confines of the
Supreme Court language and to continue to accept the basic tenets
of parens patriae and the concept that juvenile matters are basic-
-ally civil rather than criminal. The logical extension of this view
is that the constitutional guarantees of an adult criminal trial need
not apply to juvenile court proceedings. A view contrary to that
of the McKeiver Court is to accept -the decisions of Kent, Gault,
and Winship as indicative of Supreme Court discomfort with the
lack of due process in the juvenile courts. The corollary of such
a view would be the broadening of the constitutional requirements
of due process in various phases of a juvenile court proceeding.
Due Process at the Detention Hearing
The courts in three jurisdictions-the District of Columbia,
Wisconsin, and California-have accepted the latter view and de-
termined what due process requires at the detention hearing of
a juvenile accused of a crime.'0  Baldwin v. Lewis'0 7 was de-
cided by the United States District Court in Wisconsin prior to the
McKeiver decision. Richard Baldwin, -seventeen years old, was
detained on suspicion of arson. In his application for a writ of
habeas corpus he sought discharge on the grounds that his right
to bail under the eighth amendment0 8 had been violated and that
he had been denied his right to a probable cause determination
that he had committed the crime of which he was accused. He
argued ,that he could not be held in custody without such a prob-
able cause finding. 10 9 After holding that Baldwin's initial deten-
tion was not in violation of his fourth amendment rights, the court
went on to consider the procedure at the subsequent detention
hearing.110 The court first noted that a detention hearing held
pursuant to the Wisconsin statutory scheme could result in the
deprivation of a juvenile's liberty for an indeterminate period.
The court emphasized that any person who is deprived of his
106. Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300
F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969); In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 861 (1966).
107. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd for failure to exhaust state
remedies, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971 ).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
109. 300 F. Supp. at 1223.
110. Id. at 1224-26.
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liberty because he is suspected of committing a crime, must be
accorded the due process rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, the court found that the detention hearing
must satisfy due process demands.111
The Baldwin court held that a detention hearing must in-
clude a determination as to whether there is probable cause to
believe that an act has been committed which, if committed by
an adult, would be a crime, and that the juvenile in custody has in
fact committed such an act. 112
In 1969, the year of the Baldwin decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered the case
of Cooley v. Stone."' Ronald Cooley, sixteen years old, was
,taken into custody in connection with a burglary and detained at
the Receiving Home for Children. A detention hearing was held,
but there was no judicial inquiry into probable cause. The only
matter considered by the juvenile court was whether to release
Cooley to the custody of his mother. In granting Cooley's writ
of habeas corpus the district court held that no person could law-
fully be held in penal custody by the state without a prompt ju-
dicial determination of probable cause.' 14  The district court
predicated its holding on Gault and Kent, finding that the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment apply to juveniles as well as
adults. 1 5  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed this ruling and further stated that the result
would be compelled on fifth, as well as fourth, amendment
grounds."16 Two years later the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
panded the decision in Cooley, holding in Brown v. Fauntleroy
1 7
that even a juvenile who is not detained has the right to a prob-
able cause determination at a preliminary hearing.
In M.A.P. v. Ryan,"" however, the newly established District
111. Id. at 1232.
112. Id. On the question of bail the court held that an appropriate standard
for detention, applied in a manner consistent with due process, is an adequate sub-
stitute for bail. The court approved of the standard in the Wisconsin Children's
Code which required that a juvenile shall be released uiless,
there is a finding that because of the circumstances, including the gravity
of the alleged crime, the nature of the juvenile's home life, and the ju-
venile's previous contacts with the court, the parents or guardian of the
juvenile are incapable under the circumstances to care for him.
Id. at 1233.
113. 414F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1214. The fifth amendment provides in part that no person shall
be deprived of "liberty . . . without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
117. 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
118. 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
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of Columbia Court of Appeals" 9 declined to follow the Brown
decision when a juvenile who had not been detained moved for
a probable cause hearing. 120  The court found there was no con-
stitutional right to a probable cause hearing, and rejected any im-
plication in Brown that any arrested person has a right to a deter-
mination as to the validity of his arrest.'' Furthermore, the court
noted that the extensive inquiry that must be made into the facts
and law before a delinquency petition is filed, protects the ju-
venile against the filing of an unfounded petition.122 The court
found that the standard to be met in juvenile proceedings is funda-
mental fairness,' and that -there was nothing about the District
of Columbia procedure which violated this standard.' 24
In California four cases have to some extent resolved
the issues of what findings, procedure and evidence are required
at the detention hearing.'25 The seminal case dealing directly
with detention hearings under the provisions of the California
Juvenile Court Law is In re Macidon.26 This case involved a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the minor's release
from the detention which had been ordered pending the adjudica-
,tory hearing. The petition filed against Macidon alleged he had
committed a public offense. 2 7  Macidon had been released by
119. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals felt free to examine the hold-
ing in Brown and accept or reject it for two reasons. The District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 provides that effective Febru-
ary 1, 1971, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is the highest court in
the District of Columbia, and is no longer subject to review by the United States
Court of Appeals. Therefore the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is not
bound by decisions of the United States Court of Appeals rendered after that date.
Brown was decided February 26, 1971, and thus, although entitled to great respect,
is not binding on the District Court of Appeals.
The court also decided that it was not bound by the Brown decision because
that decision had been based on federal constitutional grounds by the federal cir-
cuit court of appeals for that jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals adopted the view that state courts may exercise their own judgment on a
federal constitutional question until that question is answered by the United States
Supreme Court, and then analogized the position of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals to the highest court in a state. Id. at 312-13.
120. Id. at 313.
121. Id. at 315.
122. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2305 (1973).
123. 285 A.2d 310, 316 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
124. Id. at 317.
125. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970);
In re Dennis H., 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971); In re Larry
W., 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1971); In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App.
2d 600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966).
126. 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966).
127. Section 602 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code brings within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court any person under 18 years of age who vio-
lates any state or United States law or city or county ordinance. CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 602 (West 1972). Macidon was alleged to be one of five sus-
pects who grabbed a twelve year old girl as she was walking home from school,
used vulgar language around her, and stole her purse.
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the police to the custody of his mother on written promise to ap-
pear before the probation officer. When he appeared before the
probation officer he again was released to the custody of his
mother. Several weeks later a detention hearing was held and
Macidon was ordered detained' 28 on the basis that his detention
was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity and should be
continued for the protection of the community.
The Court of Appeal for the First District held that the de-
tention order was without support in 'the record and ordered Maci-
don's release.12 9 It was clear to the court that there was no evi-
dence to place Macidon within -any of the categories outlined in
the statute as possible bases for detention. Furthermore, he had
denied any involvement in the offense, and there was no evidence
to contradict this denial. The court concluded that under the
terms of the statute it was questionable whether commission of
the offense, if established, would in itself be sufficient evidence
to furnish a ground for detention.' Thus, the case may be inter-
preted as requiring a prima facie showing of the minor's guilt be-
fore he can be detained, whenever the offense is denied by the
minor. Such a finding necessarily would precede any considera-
tion of the statutory criteria for detention.
The Macidon holding is not completely clear, however, be-
cause the juvenile court initially had found that no statutory
grounds for detention existed.' 3 ' Therefore it can be argued that
if statutory criteria for detention are met, the issue of probable
cause will not be reached. Such an interpretation of Macidon is
entirely too restrictive.
In the course of its opinion, the Macidon court relied on the
case of In re Contreras."' The court in Contreras held that
nothing in the juvenile court law should be interpreted as allowing
the imposition of unlawful restraints upon personal liberty.
83
Furthermore, the court determined that when the juvenile denies
his alleged delinquency, his liberty should not be taken from him
until his guilt is established by legal evidence.- 4  Although the
128. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 604, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The court declined to
decide whether detention could be ordered in any matter where the minor is not
first detained pursuant to the California Welfare and Institutions Code sections
626 through 630, which provide for the peace officer and the probation officer
to exercise their discretion as to whether or not the child should be released from
custody.
129. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 610, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
130. Id. at 608, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
131. H. THOMPSON, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK 45 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as THOMPSON].
132. 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
133. Id. at 790-91, 241 P.2d at 633-34.
134. Id.
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Contreras case dealt directly with the jurisdictional phase of the
proceedings, the court in Macidon stated that the Contreras hold-
ing would have equal application to detention proceedings. 35 This
reasoning by the Macidon court lends support to the position that
a minor charged with an act denounced by law should not have
fewer constitutional rights or guarantees than an adult under
similar circumstances.' Thus, a logical interpretation of the
Macidon decision would seem to be that in all cases where a ju-
venile is to be deprived of his liberty (detained) prior to an
adjudicatory -hearing, his guilt must be established by legal evi-
dence, at least to the extent of 'a probable cause determination
that he committed the offense charged. Indeed some judges have
so interpreted Macidon and require a probable cause showing in
every case where the minor denies the offense.'1 7
Subsequent to Macidon an amendment to the Juvenile Court
Act granted -the juvenile ,the right to remain silent, the right to
confront witnesses, and the right to cross-examine persons ex-
amined by the court in the detention hearing. 138  Following this
amendment the California Supreme Court considered juvenile
detention in the case of In re William M.13 1 In In re William M.
the court interpreted the amendment as expressing the intention of
the legislature that the probation officer be required to present
facts which will support the minor's detention-that is, present a
prima facie case that the minor committed the alleged offense.
The court noted that if no such showing is made, the juvenile
court will lack the "immediate and urgent necessity" to detain a
youth charged with committing an offense. 4 °
In William M. the juvenile court had found that, on the basis
of the police report, a prima facie case was established. Although
William M. had denied the offense he had not challenged any of
the facts in the report insofar as they established the case against
him. Under these circumstances, the supreme court held the ju-
venile court properly relied on the police report in the finding of
a prima facie case. 141
135. In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 609, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (1966).
136. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 790, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
137. THOMPSON, supra note 131, at 45.
138. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 630(b) (West Supp. 1974). The 1967
amendment added subdivision (b) to section 630. The statute was again amended
in 1968 to grant the right to confrontation only of those persons examined by
the court at the hearing. Prior to 1967, there were no provisions in the statutes
protecting the right against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation of
witnesses at the detention hearing.
139. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
140. 3 Cal. 3d at 28, 473 P.2d at 745-46, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42.
141. Id. at 29 n.21, 473 P.2d at 746 n.21, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 42 n.21.
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The Court of Appeal for the Second District, in In re Larry
W., 142 considered the juvenile's right to confront witnesses and re-
jected the contention that no valid detention order can be made
-unless live witnesses, subject to cross-examination, appear. The
court in that case perceived no requirement in the statute or
in the William M. decision that would make a police or proba-
tion officer's report inadmissible at the detention hearing.
Nevertheless, the court recognized that the minor may wish to ex-
amine the persons who have submitted written reports. Ac-
cordingly, the court found that a minor should be entitled to a
reasonable continuance to secure the presence of such persons in
court if need be. This procedure preserves the minor's right to
a full hearing including the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.'1 3
An important adjunct to the Larry W. holding is found in
In re Dennis H.144  In that case the minor's counsel made a re-
quest to cross-examine the makers of written police reports and
other documents submitted by the probation officer. A continu-
ance was granted to secure the presence of these witnesses.
However, at the continued hearing, the probation officer rested
on the written evidence, having made no attempt to secure the
writers of these reports as witnesses. The court held that once
a minor has exercised his right to demand confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, "it becomes the duty of the court to see
that those persons are present at the continued hearing or lose
the right to rely on the written declarations and affidavits.' 45
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to
rule directly on the issue of whether a probable cause finding
should be required in detention hearings, the decisions by the
Wisconsin and California courts and by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia are encouraging signs.' 46
The courts in Cooley and Baldwin promote the view that Gault
and Kent have initiated a movement toward granting the full
range of constitutional safeguards to the juvenile offender.
To some commentators this trend marks the doom of the juvenile
court because they believe it will create "an adversary, criminal
court for children with full homage paid to legal technicalities but
142. 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1971).
143. Id. at 293-94, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
144. 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971).
145. Id. at 355, 96 Cal. Rptr at 794 (emphasis added).
146. See also In re Black Bonnet v. State, 257 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973);
People v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 298 N.E.2d 109 (1973). Both cases deal with
detention after a petition has been filed and hold that there must be a prompt
probable cause finding to justify detention beyond a few days. See additional dis-
cussion of Mucci in note 57 supra.
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perhaps little or no attention to the special needs of the child.1'147
It is questionable whether these fears are justified.
Those cases which have expanded the constitutional rights
afforded to juveniles have done so in the procedural realm.
These expansions need not be accompanied by changes in the
parens patriae approach of the juvenile court. As the Supreme
Court cogently expressed in In re Gault,
[t]he observance of due process standards, intelligently and
not ruthlessly administered will not compel the States to
abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the
juvenile process. 148
In fact, the Court observed that procedural regularity with its fair-
ness and impartiality may be more impressive and therapeutic as
far as the juvenile is concerned than a procedure without such at-
tributes. 149  In re Winship reiterates the view that procedural
safeguards will not destroy the beneficial aspects of the juvenile
court, since the opportunity to review the child's social history dur-
ing the dispositional hearing and to consider his individualized
treatment will remain unimpaired. 5 ' This strongly suggests that
perhaps the only phase in the proceeding in which the unique-
ness of the juvenile court should be retained is the dispositional
phase, when the special needs of the child are considered.' 51
Whatever "treatment" results from the parens patriae approach
prior to actual disposition will not be jeopardized merely because
due process is required. The guaranteeing of a juvenile's constitu-
tional rights may do more to engender respect for the law than
a well-intentioned, but less than fundamentally fair proceeding.
Thus, in a sense, greater adherance to due process standards may
set the stage for the juvenile's increased receptiveness to treat-
ment.
Furthermore, granting a juvenile the right to a probable
cause determination before he can be detained does not interfere
with the major philosophy of the juvenile court. It would be un-
realistic to think that detention is an integral part of the treatment
process which is designed to meet the special needs of children.' 52
The detention serves only to assure that the juvenile will appear
147. Changing Times, 23 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 15-16 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Changing Times].
148. 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
149. Id. at 26.
150. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
151. Changing Times, supra note 147, at 16.
152. Although detention is not an integral part of treatment, the special needs
of children in a detention center must be met once the decision to detain has been
made. There is no question that the unique requirements of childhood must be
considered in this setting.
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in court and that he will not commit another act dangerous to him-
self or society.153  The hearing at which the decision whether or
not to detain is made must satisfy due process of law in order that
the juvenile not be subjected to arbitrary confinement.I"
WHAT FINDING SHOULD BE REQUIRED AT A
DETENTION HEARING?
The entire judicial handling of the juvenile is designed and
intended to be non-criminal. However, a consideration of the
statutory and constitutional requirements in California for the ar-
rest of adults charged with crimes and their subsequent release
or detention provides helpful guidelines for determining the means
by which the rights of juveniles can best be protected.
The Standard for Detention of Adults
Arrest. An adult in California is protected, by statute and
constitutional requirements, from unreasonable or arbitrary ar-
rest. Arrest of adults may be made with or without a warrant.' 55
An officer may arrest for misdemeanors only if he has reasonable
cause to believe the person has committed an offense in his
presence, but he may arrest for felonies not committed in his
presence, if he has probable cause to believe the person arrested
committed the felony.' "" If the arrest is without a warrant, and
the person arrested is not released, a complaint stating the charge
must be placed before ,the magistrate.5 7  In the case of a misde-
meanor, the complaint serves as the basis for an arrest warrant. 15 8
In the case of a felony, a preliminary examination will be held
which will result either in dismissal of the case or in the filing
of an information which charges the crime or crimes alleged.' "
If the officer arrests a person under a warrant, the warrant will
have been issued on the basis of a magistrate's finding that the
offense has been committed and that there is reasonable ground
to believe the defendant committed it. 0
153. Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention
or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 164 (1969).
154. Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1233 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
155. CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West 1972).
156. Id. For certain misdemeanor vehicle offenses, the officer may often -issue
a citation in lieu of making the arrest. See id. § 818.
157. Id. § 849 (West Supp. 1974).
158. B. WITKIN, CALIF. CRIM. PROC. 98 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WITKIN].
159. CAL. PEN. CODE § 859b (West Supp. 1974).
160. Id. § 813 (West 1970).
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Bail and release on own recognizance. After arrest, the
rights of the arrestee are further protected. For Vehicle Code
misdemeanors, if the person arrested is not taken before the
magistrate, he is released upon a written promise to appear. 61
For other offenses the defendant may be released on bail or on
his own recognizance (OR).
Although bail is not always mandated, the defendant may be
admitted to bail before conviction as a matter of right 6 2 except
in capital offenses.' 63 The suspect may be released on bail before
the preliminary examination, before trial after being held to
answer, or before trial after an indictment.' The trend toward
eliminating money bail has resulted, in recent years, in an increase
of OR release programs allowing persons to be released upon a
promise to appear without the requirement of posting bail. 6 '
According to the American Bar Association standards, the
decision to release a defendant before trial should be based on
whether there is a substantial risk of non-appearance by the de-
fendant, and not on a so-called preventive detention basis.16
One author has concluded that,
[iln addition to the constitutional issues, that is, whether the
eighth amendment precludes preventive detention, and
whether such detention violates due process in controverting
the presumption of innocence and inhibiting a defendant's
ability -to prepare his case . . . [s]erious questions also arise
with respect to the actual need for preventive detention, and
whether it will have any real effect on the crime problem.1 67
It should be noted that many adults do remain in custody
prior to determination of their gult; yet the provisions in the law
for bail and OR release prescribe release in most cases.
Preliminary examination. If -the defendant is charged with a
felony he must be brought before the magistrate without unneces-
sary delay, 6 " and in any event within two days !after his arrest. 69
161. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40504(a) (West 1971).
162. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1271 (West 1970).
163. Id. § 1270.
164. Id. § 1273.
165. See Portman, "To Detain or Not to Detain?"-A Review of the Back-
ground, Current Proposals, and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 224, 229 (1970). [hereinafter cited as Portman]. The author discusses in-
novations and efforts to improve the bail system. The experience of the Santa
Clara County pretrial release program has been that there is no significant differ-
ence in failure to appear rates for those released on OR and those qualified for
OR but released on bail. REPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINIS-
TRATION, SANTA CLARA COUNTY PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAM 13 (1973).
166. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, § 5.1 (App. Draft 1968).
167. Portman, supra note 165, at 256.
168. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
169. CAL. PEN. CODE § 825 (West 1972). The statute merely states a maxi-
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The California Constitution authorizes prosecution by information
"after examination and commitment by a magistrate."'' 70  Before
the information is filed, there must be a preliminary examination
of the case and an order holding the defendant to answer. 17' The
purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether
there is probable cause 'to hold the defendant to answer. 7 2  If
at this stage there is a finding of no probable cause, then the
prosecution cannot go forward and the defendant cannot be de-
tained. 7 '
It is not clear that there is a constitutional right to a prelimi-
nary examination in all cases. In California, the Penal Code man-
dates that there be a preliminary examination before an informa-
tion is filed. 174  No preliminary examination is required, however,
when a grand jury brings an indictment, the charge is only a misde-
meanor, or the defendant waives the preliminary examination. 7 '
A preliminary examination is not required when there is an indict-
ment because the grand jury presumably performs the same
weeding out function as the preliminary examination. 7 6 In the
case of a misdemeanor, the necessity of a screening procedure is
not considered to be so critical; therefore, the prosecution can pro-
ceed by complaint. 177
Since felonies may be prosecuted by either indictment or in-
formation, 78 California courts have held that a defendant is not
denied due process or equal protection if proceeded against by
an indictment, which does not require a preliminary examina-
tion.'17  However, the preliminary examination has been recog-
mum and does not authorize a two-day detention; therefore, a lesser delay, if
unreasonable, may be illegal. WIrKIN, supra note 158, at 113.
170. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
171. CAL. PEN. CODE § 738 (West 1970).
172. WITKIN, supra note 158, at 128. The preliminary examination also serves
the practical purposes of providing a means of discovery for the defense, preserv-
ing the testimony of witnesses and allowing stipulations to submit the case on the
transcript. Id.
173. See CAL. PEN. CoDE § 738 (West 1970) and WITKIN, supra note 158, at
127-28. Although the quantum of proof is less than that required at trial, the
same rules of admissibility apply; consequently, a commitment cannot be based
on incompetent evidence. People v. Davidson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 331, 335, 38
Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1964).
174. CAL. PEN. CODE § 738 (West 1970).
175. WrTKIN, supra note 158, at 128-29.
176. Id. at 128.
177. CAL. PEN. CODE § 682(3) (West 1970).
178. CAL. CONST., art. I § 8; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 682, 737, 739, 917, 949
(West 1970).
179. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.
3d 710, 746-47, 497 P.2d 1121, 1146, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 410 (1972), citing, e.g.,
In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 649, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971).
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nized by the United States Supreme Court as a "critical stage" of
a state's criminal process, 180 and several recent federal cases have
accorded the right to a preliminary hearing constitutional status
when the defendant is incarcerated and there has been no prior
determination of judicial probable cause. 1" In Pugh v. Rain-
water, 8 ' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a pre-
liminary hearing for probable cause is necessary for persons ar-
rested pursuant to an information filed by the state attorney and
for persons charged with a misdemeanor, unless they will not be
incarcerated before trial. The court emphasized that its concern
was not with how the trial would be affected by the absence of
a preliminary hearing but with the validity of pretrial detention
without a judicial probable cause finding. 183
Other cases not directly dealing with preliminary hearings
lend support to the Pugh decision by holding that a probable cause
finding by a judicial officer is mandated, by due process, before
an individual can be deprived of his liberty. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a parolee, after arrest, can be re-
,turned -to custody for violation of parole conditions only after a
proboble cause determination.18 4 In Shadwick v. City of Tam-
pa" 5 the high Court noted that arrest warrants cannot issue
without a probable cause determination by a neutral and detached
magistrate.
In sum, although the Supreme Court has not held that fail-
ure -to hold a preliminary hearing violates the due process clause
in every case,' 8 6 a number of cases in the federal courts evidence
a pattern of requiring a probable cause finding whenever deten-
tion before trial is involved.' 87
180. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
181. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1077 (1973); Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v.
Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Pugh the procedure excluding misde-
meanants faced with potential imprisonment from preliminary hearings was held
to be violative of the fourth amendment and the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
182. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 (1973).
183. Id. at 786-87.
184. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
185. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
186. See, e.g., Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913); Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
187. In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pugh v. Rainwater,
noted that even temporary deprivation of property without a hearing has been held
impermissible. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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Which Safeguards Present in Adult Proceedings Should Apply to
Juvenile Detention Hearings?
The adult alleged to have committed a crime is protected by
statute and constitutional requirements against unreasonable ar-
rest, detention, and prosecution. In contrast, a juvenile is given
substantially fewer protections. A comparison of the safe-
guards made available to adults in California with those provided
to juveniles during the intake process from arrest to trial, illus-
-trates significant differences. These differences make it appar-
ent that at some point prior to the actual guilt/innocence phase
of the process (adjudication), the rights of the juvenile against
unreasonable detention need to be safeguarded by a probable
cause finding that he has committed the crime of which he stands
accused.
Arrest and temporary detention. A law enforcement officer
may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody any minor
under eighteen if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that
the minor is a dependent,"' 8 beyond control,' or has violated a
law.'00  Included within the category of juveniles who have vio-
lated a law are those who have disobeyed a juvenile court order
after coming within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of the
vaguely defined offense of "leading an immoral life." '' In con-
trast, the arrest of an adult for a violation of the law cannot be
188. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 600, 625 (West 1972). The depend-
ent child is one who is not receiving proper and effective parental care; who is
destitute and not provided with the necessities of life or a suitable home; who is
dangerous because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality;
or whose home is unfit because of neglect, cruelty, depravity or physical abuse by
either of his parents. Id. § 600.
189. See id. §§ 601, 625. A beyond control child is one who habitually re-
fuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders of parents and school authorities,
who is habitually truant from school; or who is in danger of leading an immoral
life. Id. § 601.
190. See id. §§ 602 (West Supp. 1974), 625.1 (West 1972).
191. In California a juvenile falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
if he fails to obey a lawful order of that court after having been found to be a
person described by section 601. Id. § 602. Section 601 includes within its ambit
such broad categories of offenses as "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd
or immoral life." A three-judge federal district court held that this portion of
section 601 is void because of vagueness, and a permanent injunction was granted
against its use in San Francisco County. Gonzalez v. Maillard, No. 50424 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 918 (1974). The remand on the
ground of mootness was based on Stefle v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (The Court will avoid reaching the con-
stitutional question if state court construction of the statute will sufficiently nar-
row it). It is interesting to note that Gonzalez was the second-oldest case on
the United States Supreme Court docket. The fact that vague statutes similar to
the one at issue in Gonzalez exist in most jurisdictions may account for the re-
luctance of the Supreme Court to reach a decision and declare the statute uncon-
stitutionally vague. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2 (Supp. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (1974).
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sustained when that law proscribes such imprecisely defined be-
havioral activity. 192
After taking a juvenile into temporary custody, the officer
has several options. He can release the minor without condition,
release him pursuant to a written promise to appear before the
probation officer,' 93 or take him before the probation officer
whose alternatives -are basically the same as those of the police
officer.' The minor may be detained for a period not to exceed
forty-eight hours (excepting non-judicial days) from the time of
arrest. As a practical matter, a juvenile detained on Friday even-
ing remains in detention until Monday when the probation officer
begins his investigation. 95  Moreover, the probation officer
can detain the minor for an additional forty-eight hours before
filing 'the petition which triggers 'the requirement that a detention
hearing be held the following day.' 90 Since non-judicial days are
not included within the forty-eight hour period, in many cases
there is no effective means under the present system to insure
release of the minor within the first seventy-two hours after arrest.
In many California counties, on every Monday, a large num-
ber of children who have been detained over the weekend are
released without a petition being filed or a detention order being
sought.'97  Similar unwarranted detention is avoided in the adult
system because the defendant often is released on bail or his own
recognizance. In contrast, a juvenile charged with a crime may
be detained at the discretion of the probation officer. 9  There-
fore, even before the juvenile reaches the detention hearing phase
of the juvenile court process he may have been 'held in custody for
a considerable period of time, whereas an adult would have been
released while awaiting trial or a preliminary examination.
192. Vague sections of the California Penal Code typically have met with more
direct action than the Court was willing to take in Gonzalez. See, e.g., In re
Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966) (declaring unconstitution-
ally vague section 650 1/2 of the Penal Code which made it a misdemeanor
willfully and wrongfully to commit any act openly outraging public decency).
193. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 626 (West 1972).
194. Id. § 629.
195. Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-Evaluation, 19 HAST. L.J.
47, 73 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Boches].
196. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 631 (West Supp. 1974).
197. Boches, supra note 195, at 77 n.167. There is no provision for appeal
from an order of detention. The proper remedy is habeas corpus. JUVENILE
COURT PRACTICE, supra note 83, at 65, citing In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d
600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus counsel
should point out that in all fairness the juvenile should be entitled to the pre-
sumption of innocence, and the court should avoid the anomalous result of detain-
ing someone presumed to be innocent only to release him after he is found to
have committed the offense. 14 AM. JUR. TRIALS, Juvenile Court Proceedings
§ 48, at 663 (1968).
198. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628 (West 1972).
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Bail. Constitutional and statutory provisions regarding bail
generally have been held to have no application in juvenile court
proceedings on the ground that such proceedings are civil and not
criminal."'9 In addition, one commentator has urged that bail
should not be a matter of right in a juvenile case because a child
in trouble may need care immediately and such care is not pro-
vided by a simple release from custody.200 This commentator also
has contended that habeas corpus can effectively accomplish the
release of a juvenile who has been arbitrarily kept in custody prior
to adjudication.2 0 1
The California Supreme Court, while declining to consider
whether juveniles are constitutionally entitled -to bail, has con-
cluded that California's Juvenile Court Law, when properly ad-
ministered, provides an adequate system for prehearing release
of juveniles without bail.202
A few cases in other jurisdictions have held that the constitu-
tional right to release on bail pending trial is applicable in juvenile
court proceedings. 2 3  The foundation for this minority view rests
upon two assumptions. First, it is reasoned that the juvenile
courts were not established to deprive the juvenile of his consti-
tutional rights.20 4 Second, it has been found that any proceeding
,that may result in the deprivation of liberty requires the applica-
tion of constitutional guarantees whether the proceeding is civil
or criminal.205
A discussion of all the arguments for and against utilizing the
bail concept in the juvenile system is not within the scope of this
article. It should be noted, however, that it seems unwise to con-
sider the application of the right to bail in the juvenile context
when such persuasive arguments have been made for its abolition
in the adult system. 206
A probable cause finding for detention. Among those juris-
dictions requiring that there be a detention hearing once the initial
temporary detention period has lapsed, only four prescribe that
there be a probable cause determination at that hearing,2 7 and
199. 14 AM. JUR. TRIALS, Juvenile Court Proceedings § 48, at 663 (1968), cit-
ing In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952).
200. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L REV. 547, 552
(1957).
201. Id.
202. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
203. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 202
La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943).
204. State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 441, 12 So. 2d 211, 213 (1943).
205. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960).
206. See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 11, 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 1125, 1180 (1965); Portman, supra note 165, at 229.
207. ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (1971); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312 (1970);
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only three mandate such a finding prior to deciding whether or
not to detain the juvenile.2"' The detention hearing serves ap-
proximately the same function in juvenile proceedings as the pre-
liminary hearing does in adult criminal proceedings-that is, it
is a means of determining whether the individual shall be detained
and proceedings against him continued.20 9 Because there is no
right ,to release on bail or on OR for juveniles accused of 'a crime,
it is imperative that in the detention hearing the court make a
finding commensurate with the seriousness of further depriving
a juvenile of his liberty. The evidentiary standard which would
be appropriate in the detention hearing is a finding of probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
juvenile is the person who committed it. The issue presently
confronted at juvenile detention hearings is merely whether it is
necessary to detain the minor for his protection, the protection of
others, or because it is deemed likely he will flee -the jurisdic-
tion.2"0 In California, case law has determined that there must
be a finding of probable cause at the detention hearing when the
allegations in the petition are denied by the juvenile. 211  This re-
quirement should be applicable even in those cases where the alle-
gations in the petition are not denied, because of the frequency
with which juveniles admit the petitions though there may be a
legal basis upon which to predicate a denial. 12 Only in this way
will the right of juveniles to be free from unreasonable detention
be safeguarded. 213
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-5 (1972); N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 728 (McKin-
ney 1963). See text accompanying notes 46-63 supra.
208. See note 207 supra for citation to statutes of Alaska, Illinois and New
York. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra for a discussion of the procedure
in the District of Columbia.
209. A preliminary hearing in the adult system also serves to weed out prose-
cutions on groundless charges. In this sense the preliminary hearing is similar
to the motion for summary judgment and the demurrer in civil cases.
210. See, e.g., CAL. WELF & INST'NS CODE § 636 (West 1972); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-1404 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-7-8 (1973).
211. In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970);
In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App 2d 600, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966). See text accom-
panying notes 126-40 supra.
212. Interview by authors with Professor Aidan R. Gough, Alternate Referee,
Juvenile Court, Santa Clara County, Mar. 20, 1974. Waiver of the right to a
probable cause finding should be made only with the assistance of counsel unless
the child has validly waived counsel.
213. The majority of cases discussing the need for a judicial determination of
probable cause when a juvenile is not detained have held that such a juvenile has
no right to a probable cause hearing. In the Interests of D.M.D., 54 Wis. 2d
313, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); M.A.P v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 313 (D.C. Ct. App.
1971). Only one court has held that a non-detained juvenile has the right to a
probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing. See Brown v. Fauntleroy,
442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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WHAT DOES DUE PROCESS REQUIRE AT A JUVENILE
PROBABLE CAUSE DETENTION HEARING?
In the watershed decision of In re Gault,214 the Supreme
Court placed juveniles within the protection of the basic guaran-
tees of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Although the decision related to the adjudicatory phase
of the proceedings, we submit that the same due process con-
siderations should be given at the detention hearing, since it is
a critical stage of the juvenile court proceedings, 215 and, in Cali-
fornia, may result in more than two weeks of involuntary deten-
tion.21 6 Because of the critical nature of the detention hearing,
the juvenile should be entitled to the constitutional protection of
adequate notice of the hearings, disclosure of the offense with
which he has been charged,21 7 the right to counsel at the hear-
ing, 21s the right to have counsel appointed if he appears without
counsel, 2 9 and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.22° Further, it is implicit that due process requires the pres-
ence of the juvenile at this critical hearing. In addition, the same
rules governing the admissibility of evidence at an adult criminal
trial or preliminary examination should be required at a juvenile
detention hearing.
Evidentiary Rules
The dichotomy between due process and parens patriae that
Gault and its progeny have sought to eliminate still exists in the
rules governing admissibility of evidence in juvenile court pro-
ceedings. In California it is not clear whether the Evidence Code
is applicable to all proceedings in the juvenile court. Section 300
of the Evidence Code provides that the Code applies in every
court except as otherwise provided by statute. 221  The comment
to that section of the Code points out that section 300 does not
affect any other statute that relaxes rules of evidence for specified
purposes.222 To the extent, then, that the evidentiary standards
214. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
215. The Supreme Court has held that, as to adult criminal procedure, the sixth
amendment requires counsel at the preliminary hearing since it is a critical stage.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
216. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 636 (West 1972). See note 2 supra.
217. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
218. Id. at 41; CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 633 (West 1972).
219. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West 1972). This section provides
that counsel must be appointed in sections 601 and 602 cases if the minor is with-
out counsel, even if he is able to afford representation.
220. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 630
(b) (West Supp. 1974).
221. CAL EvID. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1974).
222. Id. Comment-Law Revision Commission (West 1966).
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for juvenile court proceedings set forth in the Welfare and
Institutions Code relax general evidentiary standards, they take
precedence over the Evidence Code. 23 The relevant Welfare
and Institutions Code sections provide that at the detention hear-
ing, the court shall hear all "relevant evidence; '224 at the jurisdic-
tional hearing, "any matter or information relevant and material
to the circumstances or acts which are alleged" may be heard, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt supported by legally admissible
evidence to support a finding that a minor has committed a crime
is necessary; 225 and, at the dispositional hearing, evidence shall
include the social study of the minor made by the. probation officer
as well as any other relevant and material evidence. 226
A general summary of admissibility of evidence in California
shows that evidence initially must be material,227 in addition to
being relevant.22 Evidence which is -technically incompetent,
such as hearsay, may be excluded by a timely objection but is not
inadmissible per se.220 In contrast, the Welfare and Institutions
Code section delineating the evidence admissible at the detention
hearing does not provide that the evidence be material, nor does
it exclude technically incompetent or highly prejudicial evidence.
It has been held that the police or probation officer's report
is admissible at the detention hearing.230 The juvenile's rights are
protected to some degree, however, because if the report is in-
troduced at the detention hearing, the minor is entitled to a con-
tinuance so that the presence of those persons who prepared the
reports may be secured for cross-examination. 23' It is the re-
sponsibility of the probation officer to produce the necessary wit-
nesses for the court in such a case.232  The rights of the juvenile
223. The relevant sections are CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §H 635, 701, 706
(West 1972).
224. Id. § 635.
225. Id. § 701. Under what is called the "revolving-door" theory of evidence,
all relevant evidence comes in, but in determining jurisdiction the court considers
only evidence admissible in a criminal or civil case, depending on whether the
case is brought under section 600, 601 or 602. THOMPSON, supra note 131, at
50.
226. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 706 (West 1972).
227. CAL. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
228. Id. § 350.
229. Id. § 140, COmment-Law Revision Commission. See Mogilner, Admis-
sibility of Evidence in Juvenile Court, 46 CALIF. ST. B.J. 310 (1971). The author
states that since section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that
any relevant and material evidence is admissible, it may be that technically in-
competent evidence is admissible at the court's discretion. Under section 706
technically incompetent evidence clearly is admissible so long as it is relevant and
material. Id. at 312-13.
230. In re Larry W., 16 Cal. App. 3d 290, 94 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1971).
231. Id.
232. In re Dennis H., 19 Cal. App. 3d 350, 96 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
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are additionally protected by the California Supreme Court deci-
sion of In re Gladys R.233 In that case, the court held that the
judge presiding at the jurisdictional hearing is prohibited from
reading the social study report prior to the hearing, since the re-
port may contain information that is inadmissible and prejudi-
cial.2 4
The "protections" afforded the California juvenile in the de-
,tention hearing by the evidentiary sections of the Welfare and In-
stitutions Code may be sufficient for the determination of whether
it is urgent and necessary that the juvenile be detained. This is
true, however, only if such a finding is preceded by a probable
cause determination, during which the general rules of evidence
that protect the adult at all phases of a criminal prosecution are
available to the juvenile. 35
Procedure
The procedure at the detention hearing should be similar to
that followed at an adult preliminary hearing. We suggest Cali-
fornia's procedure as a model.236 The finding of probable cause
should be based on relevant and competent evidence. As in a
trial, witnesses should be called and evidence introduced. The
witnesses for the prosecution should be examined in the presence
of the accused and should be subject to cross-examination. 37
Further, the defense should be able to call its own witnesses and
these witnesses also should be subject to cross-examination.238
The public should be excluded from the hearing at the request
of the accused, 239 and all witnesses should be excluded and kept
233. 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
234. Id. at 861, 464 P.2d at 132, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
235. For a view that guilt or innocence of a particular offense may not be so
critical in a juvenile case see In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296,
75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969). Justice Mosk, for the majority, commented that since
a youth's alleged crime may often b- only the latest symptom of an underlying
behavioral or personality disorder, a determination of whether he committed the
particular misdeed may not b critical to the proper disposition of many juvenile
cases as it is in an adult criminal prosecution. Id. at 456-57, 450 P.2d at 303,
75 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
236. We recognize that each jurisdiction would follow a procedure modeled af-
ter its own adult criminal procedure.
237. CAL. PEN. CODE § 865 (West 1972).
238. Id. § 866. Adverse witnesses may also be called by the defense but this
practice usually is tactically unwise. For a discussion of tactical considerations
see CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 242-44 (C.E.B. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE].
239. CAL. PEN. CODE § 868 (West 1970). If the accused requests that the
public be excluded, exclusion is mandatory. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 354
P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960). Although the defendant has a right under
the California Constitution to a public examination, he may waive that right.
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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separate during the hearing at the request of the defense or pros-
ecution. 4 ° Physical evidence should be entered as evidence if
admissible under the rules of evidence applicable at the trial.24'
The witnesses need be examined only to the extent of establish-
ing a prima facie case against the accused. As in the adult hear-
ing, not all evidence available need be presented.
Some Difficulties and Possible Solutions
Arguments can be made that the requirement of a probable
cause hearing will burden the courts by consuming a significant
amount of judicial time, that it will burden the officers and other
witnesses called to testify, and that it will make it impossible to
proceed with the speedy adjudication that has been considered
necessary in the juvenile court system. Efficiency of administra-
tion has never been deemed to be of sufficient importance to take
precedence over constitutional rights. 42 Once the premise is ac-
cepted that the detention hearing is a critical stage of the juvenile
court proceedings that requires due process protections, the prob-
lem of overburdening the courts falls into proper perspective.
Nevertheless, in recognition of the practical conclusion that
clogged courts ultimately make it more difficult to provide due
process by preventing adjudication and disposition with necessary
dispatch, we emphasize that a probable cause determination hear-
ing should be provided only for juveniles accused of a crime. We
also suggest that a probable cause determination may be made
upon the basis of the probation department report if stipulated
to by the juvenile upon advice of counsel.
In courts where one judge hears all juvenile matters, the re-
quirement of a probable cause hearing will present another prob-
lem. In those courts, a means of preserving the juvenile's right
to an adjudication before an impartial judge must be found.
A possible solution might be to have local attorneys act as
referees at the detention hearings. Another arrangement
that may solve the problem would be to have the hearings con-
ducted by a judge from a neighboring county in a reciprocal
arrangement.
No doubt the same arguments that can be made against a
probable cause hearing in the juvenile court can be, and have
been, made with respect to the procedure in the adult court. It
240. Either party may make an order excluding witnesses. CAL EvID. CODE§ 777 (West 1966). The magistrate may make an order excluding witnesses on
his own motion. CAL. PEN. CODE § 867 (West 1970).
241. CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 238, at 242.
242. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Van Nuys Pub. Co.
v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1971).
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bears repeating that the primary consideration in deciding which
procedures are necessary should be the due process requirements
that a state must satisfy before it can deprive -a citizen of his
liberty.24
CONCLUSION
Statutes in jurisdictions throughout the United States do not,
as a whole, provide adequate constitutional protection to juveniles
accused of committing crimes. The United States Supreme
Court's mandate that due process requires the guarantee of many
constitutional rights to juveniles at the adjudicatory phase of the
proceedings, has led to an increasing awareness in some courts
that these same rights must be accorded to juveniles at the deten-
tion hearing as well.
By proposing that there be a probable cause determina-
tion of whether or not the juvenile has committed a crime before
he can be detained, we do not recommend that the entire ap-
proach of the juvenile court be changed. We do not believe that
the requirement of due process protections at the detention and
adjudicatory stages would conflict with a treatment-oriented,
parens patriae approach during disposition. The insistence that
the juvenile court proceeding is not criminal but civil, and there-
fore that the due process requisites of criminal proceedings are
inappropriate, is no longer a valid argument. As the problem of
juvenile delinquency continues to trouble our society, we must be
flexible in considering alternative approaches. Even the strongest
advocates of the juvenile court system admit to its imperfection
and lack of total success. This article suggests that greater due
process in the juvenile courts will enhance rather than detract
from their rehabilitative efforts. To that end, requiring a prob-
able cause determination at detention -hearings for juveniles ac-
cused of a crime is a much needed procedural reform.
243. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967) wherein the Court states:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that chil-
dren receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The ab-
sence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not al-
ways produced fair, efficient and effective procedures. Departures from
established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in en-
lightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.
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